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A B S T R A C T
The electorate’s ability to influence the European agenda
through European elections and national referenda has led
to a close inspection of public attitudes by both academics
and politicians. Taking a micro-level approach, this article
contributes to the larger literature on the formation of public
attitudes and aims at identifying the factors that influence
public attitudes towards European integration in Bulgaria,
one of the new member states. We use a national survey
and rely upon utilitarian, value-based and heuristic factors
to test several hypotheses. Although our data confirm the
argument that support is higher in countries with lower
opportunity costs of transferring sovereignty to the Euro-
pean Union, we also find that EU membership is assessed
by projecting potential benefits for future generations rather
than self-centered expectations of immediate returns.
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Introduction
The political agenda of Bulgarian governments in the post-communist era has
been simultaneously driven by a difficult political, economic and social tran-
sition and by accession to the European Union (EU). Bulgaria applied for EU
membership in 1995, started the accession negotiations in 2000, and became
an EU member state on 1 January 2007. Failure to introduce necessary reforms
in key areas, in particular in the judicial system, by successive Bulgarian
governments led to the country’s exclusion from the 2004 accession wave and
to a temporary freezing of accession negotiations in 2005. Despite difficulties
in meeting the Copenhagen accession criteria and subsequent delays in the
accession negotiations, public support has not withered. According to Euro-
barometer surveys, Bulgarian public support for EU membership has been
constantly high throughout the post-communist period. Following accession,
although positive views on the benefits of membership have dropped, 60%
Bulgarians continue to think highly of the EU and 55% of all Bulgarians think
that their country’s membership is a good thing (Eurobarometer 67, spring
2007). Consequently, Bulgaria rates as one of the most pro-European EU
member states.
This article contributes to the literature on public support for European
integration by using a case-study approach on Bulgaria, a country that has
been subjected to comparatively little research among the Central and East
European states. Taking a micro-level view while checking for macro-
economic variables, we search for explanations behind the high levels of
support for European integration in Bulgaria. We base our article on a unique
data set, collected six months before the country became an EU member. We
compared the data from this pre-accession survey with a post-accession Euro-
barometer analysis, to account for changes in Bulgarian public’s attitudes. The
results show that, although Bulgarians have a low opinion of their country’s
economic performance and state institutions, they assess the potential of EU
membership by looking into the future instead of focusing on immediate,
personal benefits.
Literature review
The literature on public support for European integration identifies an array
of determinants of individual attitudes towards the integration process, such
as expectations about economic costs and benefits, cultural characteristics,
personal values and beliefs, party allegiance, and the popularity of incum-
bent governments. For the purposes of this study, three categories of factors
are relevant: utilitarian, value-based and heuristic.
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Utilitarian theories look at the collective or individual costs and benefits
of integration. These theories reveal that an average European evaluates the
Union according to his or her country’s economic performance and role in
international relations (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993), the volume of trade
among EU members and net national returns from the EU budget (Eichen-
berg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1996). Positive attitudes also
depend upon the individual’s ability to adapt to, and benefit from, market
liberalization (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a). EU citizens form
attitudes toward EU membership that are consistent with their occupation-
based economic interests (Gabel, 1998b). An individual’s level of support is
also related to the nation’s security and trade interests within the EU and the
individual’s potential to benefit from liberalized markets (Gabel and Palmer,
1995). Studies on Central and Eastern Europe have found that ‘winners’ from
transition as well as supporters of the free market appear more likely to
support EU membership (Tucker et al., 2002; Christin, 2005). Although indi-
vidual and regional characteristics influence Central and East European
attitudes towards integration, greater weight is placed upon the benefits from
liberation and integration than on the potential gains from redistribution
(Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2006).
Public opinion is also determined by ‘value-based’ factors, such as
identification with one’s nation, as well as one’s political beliefs and values.
Inglehart (1977) argued that post-materialist political values determine
support for international integration. Recent studies, however, showed that
post-materialist variables have little or no effect on subjective evaluations of
EU membership (Janssen, 1991; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a).
Moreover, scholars have found that national contextual factors (i.e. type of
capitalist system or welfare state) condition or limit the impact of individual-
level factors, such as ideology (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). Nevertheless,
concerns about the EU’s democratic deficit, the quality of the democratic
process and its institutional framework appear to shape public attitudes
(Rohrschneider, 2002; Karp et al., 2003). More specifically, in the process of
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, a relatively slow pace of
reform and beliefs in democratic norms, the market economy and human
rights were found to positively influence support towards integration
(Christin, 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006). Whereas for average
West Europeans concerns over the loss of national identity may lead to
Euroskepticism (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Dulphy and Manigand, 2004),
for Central and East Europeans, European integration is seen as a recognition
of their ‘Europeanness’ and, as such, it carries a certainty of ‘belonging’
(Verdery, 1996; Schopflin, 2000).
A third strand of the literature maintains that citizens use proxies, or
‘shortcuts’, when they are called upon to make decisions on issues about
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which they have little or no information. On the basis of Eurobarometer data
on seven West European countries, Anderson (1998) finds evidence that
citizens tend to look to their governments or their parties when deciding
whether to support European integration. In a more general context, other
scholars show that citizens tend to be ill informed about abstract international
issues (Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Therefore, individuals rely on their informal
social environment such as friends, acquaintances, colleagues and neighbors
when called upon to evaluate such issues.
Theories and hypotheses
Although party competition has been argued to negatively influence support
towards integration in Central and East European countries (Rohrschneider
and Whitefield, 2006), this was not a factor in the Bulgarian context. Prior to
the 2005 national elections, Bulgarian politics were characterized by an elite
consensus over EU accession (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001; Giatzidis, 2004),
which induced successive governments to maintain integration as a top
priority on their agenda. The public was presented with a rather coherent
discourse on European integration. In this context, and based upon previous
findings that incumbent popularity and voter assessment of government
performance influence public support for European integration (Franklin 
et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1995), one could conceivably explain Bulgarian
public support for EU membership through government popularity.
However, in the fall of 2006, two-thirds of the Bulgarians did not trust their
national government (Eurobarometer 65). National politicians are often seen
as untrustworthy, corrupt and driven by personal interests. Hence, support
for EU accession cannot be explained by the government rate of approval. On
the contrary, Bulgarians might hope that Brussels would monitor the activi-
ties of their national government. Based on these arguments and the obser-
vation of Bulgarians’ low trust in their national government, we formulate a
first hypothesis (H1): low trust in national government translates into high
support for European integration. This viewpoint follows the thesis that the
worse the country’s situation, the higher the support for the EU (Christin,
2005), but it challenges some of the results of previous studies on Central and
Eastern Europe (Ehin, 2001) as well as some research concerning West
European states.
The second hypothesis deals with the relationship between a person’s
political values and his or her support for integration. Scholars who study
Central and Eastern Europe suggest that democratic and free market values,
positive attitudes towards minorities and liberal principles increase support
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for European integration (Cichowski, 2000; Ehin, 2001; Tucker et al., 2002;
Slomczynski and Shabad, 2003). Hence, apart from beliefs in economic
benefits, individuals perceive EU membership as a way of consolidating
freedom and democracy in their countries. EU requirements, such as the rule
of law, respect for human rights and respect for minorities, meet expectations
for good governance, transparency and the irreversibility of reforms. Support
for EU membership is therefore related to liberal democratic values (see also
Schimmelfenning, 2001). Such expectations are not unreasonable – scholars
(see Grabbe, 2006) reveal the benefits of EU conditionality in terms of both
political and economic developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Identifi-
cation with Europe, or Europeanization, is a positive determinant of support
for EU membership (White et al., 2002). Strong backing of EU accession at the
beginning of these countries’ transition period, when information about the
EU was scarce, was essentially based on the systems of values attached to the
idea of Europe. In contrast to their countries, which were perceived as
provincial, underdeveloped and authoritarian, ‘Europe’ was seen as cosmo-
politan, prosperous and democratic. Whereas the EU’s democratic deficit and
the quality of democratic processes within its institutional framework are
matters of concern for a Western European, for citizens living in Eastern
Europe the state of national democracy still lags too far behind to worry about
democratic processes in Brussels (Rohrschneider, 2002; Karp et al., 2003). Data
for Bulgaria are therefore expected to confirm that individuals with strong
beliefs in democracy are more supportive of integration (H2).
Citizens perceive national economic factors as belonging to the category
of utilitarian factors able to influence their attitude towards membership.
Previous studies show that attitudes towards European integration are
positively related to national economic conditions, the timing of entry 
into the Union and length of membership in it (Anderson and Kaltenhaler,
1996), a low inflation rate (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993) and the individual’s
ability to adapt to and benefit from market liberalization (Gabel and Palmer,
1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a). Would a person with a 
high regard for the national economy be in favor of or against EU member-
ship? Suppose that a hypothetical citizen, Mr X, thinks that the standard of
living, unemployment, inequality and economic growth in Bulgaria are
acceptable, but he is afraid that the economy could be destabilized by un-
fettered foreign competition. He therefore opposes Bulgaria’s membership.
Another hypothetical citizen, Ms Y, who also thinks highly of the Bulgarian
economy, might presume that the economy could successfully withstand
foreign competition and would even benefit from larger markets. In contrast
to Mr X, Ms Y supports EU membership. Which of the two views prevails?
Ms Y might be a more likely model of the average citizen because her view
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is supported by the economic theory that trade liberalization improves a
country’s welfare in the long run. Answers to the open-ended question in the
questionnaire show that Bulgarians assess integration in terms of long-term
benefits rather than immediate returns. Thus, our data are expected to show
that an individual’s support for integration is positively related to his or her
perception of the country’s economic performance (H3).
The next hypothesis examines the impact of ‘informal social ties’ on
opinion formation. Some studies have shown that individuals do not form
their opinions on the basis of a personal effort to acquire proper information,
but rely strongly on other members of their social environment for guidance
(Nowak et al., 1990). One may expect that such a hypothesis will hold when
the marginal cost of acquiring information is high and the marginal private
benefit is low. Thus, information that is of great social value but low individ-
ual benefit has the characteristics of a public good: it is too costly to be
provided by an individual but, once it is provided, no one can be excluded
from the benefits of it. We expect to find a positive relationship between the
pro-EU attitude of an individual’s social group and the individual’s support
for EU membership (H4).
Summarizing, we hypothesize that support for EU membership is (H1)
negatively related to trust in national government; (H2) positively related to
an individual’s beliefs in democratic norms; (H3) positively related to citizens’
opinion of the economic performance of their country; and finally (H4)
positively related to the attitude of the social group to which an individual
belongs.
Variables, data and model
Some of the variables in our analysis are equal-weight indexes incorporating
several questions. (Other than equal-weight structures were also considered
and it was found that the results were robust.) The purpose of constructing
composite variables is twofold: to increase the variability in the data, and to
obtain a more accurate measure of the variable in question by quantifying
several of its distinct aspects.1
‘EU support’ is the dependent variable. It measures the individual’s
support for his or her country’s membership in the European Union. Janssen
(1991: 443) notes that ‘the picture one gets depends heavily on the indicator
one uses to measure support.’ ‘EU support’ is constructed as an index based
on three questions (see Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the Web appendix2). All
questions in this index are positively correlated and the index is highly cor-
related with each of its components; a principal factor analysis reveals that
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all components load into the same factor (correlation tables and factor analysis
are available on request).
The variable ‘Confidence in home government’ reflects the respondent’s
trust in the country’s political class. The variable ‘Confidence in EU officials’
is based on the question: ‘On a scale of 1 to 100, rank your confidence in EU
officials.’ This question does not assume that the respondent is familiar with
particular personalities, but refers to the EU political class as a whole. ‘Demo-
cratic values’ is a composite variable based on a set of three questions refer-
ring to pluralism, the importance of elections and attitudes towards the
different constituencies of power; for instance, prioritizing government over
parliament is considered a rather authoritarian view. The variable ‘Home
economy’ captures the respondent’s perception of how the country’s economy
is performing. It is the sum of six questions about the performance of the
economy as a whole, unemployment, the standard of living, inflation and
income inequality. The variable ‘Group of friends’ measures to what extent
the respondent’s social environment favors EU membership; the source
question for this variable is ‘What percentage of your friends do you think
would support your country’s EU membership?’ A number of socioeconomic
variables were also part of the survey and used as ‘controls.’
Most of the previous research uses Eurobarometer data, which are based
on answers of the ‘yes/no/don’t know’ type. Brinegar et al. (2004) point out
that such data are insufficiently detailed for quantitative analysis. Our survey
allows the answers to vary on a scale of 1 to 100, to provide room for nuances
and diversity in opinions.3 The survey is based on a stratified random sample
of 1016 citizens. We encountered the problem of missing values in the data
to an extent that it needed to be addressed. The literature (e.g. King et al.,
2001; Little and Rubin, 2002) identifies a few distinct types of missing values,
depending on whether the probability of occurrence of a missing value is
correlated with observed or unobserved data. Unfortunately, there is no
reliable test for determining which of the types is present, since any test
should be based on the very missing values. Therefore, the nature of the
problem can best be determined by reasoning alone. Since the questions in
this survey are not of a sensitive nature, it is reasonable to believe that the
respondents have no particular motivation to refuse to answer some ques-
tions. Therefore, we can safely assume that our missing data are of either the
‘missing at random’ or the ‘missing completely at random’ type. In any 
case, a ‘multiple imputation by chained equations’ method is applicable 
(Van Buuren et al., 1999). This method replaces the missing values in the data
set with values obtained from cross-regressing all the variables.
We construct the following regression equation: ‘EU support’ is a linear
function of the variables ‘Confidence in home government’, ‘Confidence in
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EU officials’, ‘Democratic values’, ‘Home economy’, ‘Group of friends’, the
person’s employment status, some control variables, plus a stochastic error
term. The control variables are Age, Education and Gender. The first column
in Table 1 presents a ‘list-wise deletion’ OLS model, where only the obser-
vations with no missing values are included. The second column presents a
similar specification, with the control variables Age, Gender and Education
removed. The next two columns, (3) and (4), use the same specifications as
before, but with multiple imputations for the missing values.
The variable ‘Group of friends’ may raise some suspicion concerning its
exogeneity with respect to the explained variable ‘EU support,’ since a 
person might choose friends who share similar political views or, conversely,
might form political views under the influence of his or her friends. A
European Union Politics 9(3)3 7 0
Table 1 Regression results (p-values in parentheses): (1), (2) OLS with ‘list-wise
deletion’ of missing values; (3), (4) OLS with missing values calculated using the
method of multiple imputations by chained equations. All regressions use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU support EU support EU support EU support
Confid. in home gov. –0.417 –0.439 –0.257 –0.282
(.005) (.003) (.049) (.026)
Confidence in EU 1.293 1.291 1.139 1.144
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Democratic values 0.112 0.114 0.0902 0.0904
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.004)
Home economy 0.0605 0.0652 0.0625 0.0666
(.019) (.010) (.008) (.004)
Group of friends 1.353 1.361 1.623 1.633
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Unempl. (E = 0, U = 1) 12.20 12.15 0.167 –0.104
(.096) (.097) (.979) (.987)
Age categories –0.422 _ –1.252 _
(.818) (.444)
Gender (M = 0, F = 1) 2.572 _ –0.658 _
(.608) (.884)
Education categories –1.097 _ –0.666 _
(.663) (.771)
Constant 40.47 36.36 35.20 28.18
(.001) (.000) (.002) (.000)
Observations 725 729 1016 1016
Adjusted R-squared .472 .474 .477 .478
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is performed (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993)
and the null hypothesis that this variable is exogenous is not rejected.
Findings
The coefficient of the variable ‘Confidence in home government’ came out
negative and statistically significant. This indicates that Bulgarian citizens
who are dissatisfied with their political leaders’ performance tend to be more
in favor of EU integration. This finding is in line with Sánchez-Cuenca (2000),
who argues that distrust of domestic authorities and trust in EU institutions
are interdependent. This is not to say, though, that national governments
should worsen their performance and credibility for a pro-integration policy.
Such an interpretation of these results would be both inaccurate and
unfortunate.
Eurobarometer data confirm that Bulgarians have low confidence in their
national institutions and that this attitude persists over time (Eurobarometer
65, spring and fall 2006). In spring 2006, confidence in the Bulgarian Parlia-
ment was only 17%, in the government 24% and in the judiciary 20%, the
lowest figures of all the countries included in Eurobarometer surveys; confi-
dence in political parties was only 10%. Consequently, the average Bulgarian
has specific expectations about the impact that EU membership would have
on the country’s governance. Answers to the open-ended question in our
survey show that Bulgarians expect EU membership to ‘lower corruption,’
bring about respect for ‘norms,’ induce ‘order’ and ‘change mentalities for the
better.’ Although it is not clear how Bulgarians expect these changes to happen,
the data certainly suggest that dissatisfaction with the national political elite
is an important factor inducing a pro-accession attitude. This confirms
Sánchez-Cuenca’s thesis that the presence of political corruption at the national
level has a positive impact upon support for European integration (Sánchez-
Cuenca, 2000), as well as Christin’s findings that a relatively slow pace of
democratization leads to higher support for integration (Christin, 2005).
The variable ‘Confidence in EU officials’ is significant and has a positive
coefficient. Taking into account that the scale of the variable ‘Confidence in
home government’ is three times the scale of ‘Confidence in EU officials,’ the
magnitudes of the two coefficients show that the credibility of EU officials
is a determinant of support that is just as important as trust in domestic
political leaders. This result to some extent leads to a reconsideration of
McLaren’s finding that attitudes to European integration are influenced by
perceptions of EU institutions rather than perceptions of national institutions
(McLaren, 2007).
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It appears that, although Bulgarians distrust their governments and
politicians, they trust Brussels to monitor domestic authorities. Analyses based
on Eurobarometer data show a close correlation between the awareness
Bulgarians have of the EU and their trust in it. In spring 2006, Bulgarians’ level
of trust in European institutions was as follows: confidence in the European
Parliament 51%, in the European Commission 44%, in the Council 41%, in the
European Central Bank 45%, and in the European Court of Justice 39% (Euro-
barometer 65.2). One year later, following Bulgaria’s accession, trust in
European institutions had not changed significantly (Eurobarometer 67, spring
2007). Membership, therefore, does not seem to have changed Bulgarians’ view
of EU institutions. However, interestingly enough, Bulgarians’ trust in the EU
as a whole is on average lower than the EU average by 3% (54% compared
with 57%).
The positive sign for ‘Democratic values’ indicates that people who hold
democratic views are more in favor of integration. Related to the low degree
of trust in national governments and a relatively high degree of trust in EU
officials, this indicator also seems to suggest that the respondents believe that,
following EU accession, the regime in their country will consolidate its demo-
cratic features owing to conditionality and constant monitoring from Brussels.
In the literature, it has been suggested that EU conditionality has fostered
political reforms in terms of transparency, integrity, rule of law and the pro-
tection of minorities (Grabbe, 2006). Our qualitative data further support this
argument (Bulgarians expect ‘less corruption,’ ‘less bureaucracy,’ ‘norms’ and
‘laws’; Roma citizens expect ‘their life will improve’). In spring 2007, the
majority of Bulgarians viewed the European Union as ‘democratic’ (78%),
‘modern’ (76%) and ‘protective’ (Eurobarometer 67).
The coefficient of the variable ‘Home economy’ is significant and positive,
showing that those individuals who believe that Bulgaria’s economy is
performing well are likely to be in favor of European integration. However,
the survey also shows that the average rate of trust in the country’s economy
is only about 17%, which indicates that the vast majority believe that their
economy is performing poorly. The disproportion between the 17% average
evaluation of the home economy and the overall level of support for EU
membership, which in Bulgaria is about 60%, is striking. These facts, together
with the low value of the regression coefficient of the ‘Home economy’
variable, indicate the relatively low importance of macroeconomic consider-
ations in explaining the total variability in ‘EU support.’ This suggests that
macroeconomic considerations, though positively related to public attitudes,
explain only a small part of the process of opinion formation. For most of the
respondents, the reasons for being in favor or against membership are other
than concerns about the country’s economy. However, people expect
improvements at the macroeconomic level from accession. Eurobarometer
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65.2 (spring 2006) found that 48% of Bulgarians believed that the EU played
a positive role in determining the economic situation in Bulgaria. Our result
suggests only that public opinion about the performance of the home
economy is not a major determinant of support. It also indicates that good
domestic economic policies make for a good pro-European policy.
The extent of pro-integration attitudes seems to depend significantly on
a person’s social environment, as the coefficient of the variable ‘Group of
friends’ indicates. The positive sign of this coefficient suggests that this kind
of opinion formation is important in Bulgarian culture. Eurobarometer 65.2
shows that Bulgarians on average spend 30% of their socializing time
discussing EU-related topics, which may explain why the heuristic factor in
our model is so significant.
A person’s employment status appears to be hardly relevant to opinion
formation in relation to the EU. Since qualitative data show that the opening
of borders to labor migration is a determinant of support, one would think
that people who are unemployed would look forward to the liberalization of
labor markets that would supposedly come about with accession. The prospect
of new jobs abroad is seen both as an opportunity (‘for the young,’ ‘for better
income’) as well as a problem (‘the young will leave’). Bulgarians looked
positively on accession, especially since they perceive an increased oppor-
tunity to cross borders freely (‘looking for jobs’). On the other hand, it is
conceivable that the great majority of potentially migrating workers are people
who already have a job at home but are looking for higher wages abroad,
rather than individuals who have not found employment in their own country.
Besides the variables included in our quantitative analysis, the open-
ended question in the survey provided interesting insights. Many of the
answers indicate that support for accession is driven by the hope for a better
future and an improvement in the administrative and political life of the
country (‘less bureaucracy’, ‘less corruption,’ ‘more norms,’ ‘less crime’). The
impact of accession is seen in terms of future benefits rather than present ones:
although older generations fear accession (‘high prices’ but ‘low pensions’),
they see it as an opportunity for the young, ‘our kids.’ For them, support for
accession is conceived in terms of sacrifice for the betterment of future
generations rather than self-centered and narrow-minded cost/benefit
considerations.
Conclusion
As discovered by other studies on countries plagued by political instability,
corruption or sectarian interests (e.g. Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Christin, 2005;
Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006), lack of trust in national governments is
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a strong determinant of support for integration. Combined with trust in EU
officials and the belief in democratic values as determinants of support, this
suggests that Brussels is perceived as capable of raising the level of good
governance and lowering corruption by placing additional checks upon
national politics. These findings further support both Sánchez-Cuenca and
Christin’s general thesis that positive attitudes towards integration are higher
in countries with lower opportunity costs of transferring sovereignty to the
EU, owing to either political instability, the slow pace of reforms, inefficient
political actors and state institutions or poor economic performance. They
also relate to arguments in the larger literature on East European politics
according to which individuals in the young democracies of Eastern Europe
rely upon external rather than national actors for solutions (see e.g. Verdery,
1996; Tisma˘neanu, 1998; Schopflin, 2000).
Although economic performance and individual competitiveness have
been identified as determinants of EU support by previous research, in this
case a person’s employment status appears as a weak determinant of support
for European accession. Though economic benefits from EU membership
(‘more jobs,’ ‘higher income’) are expected, they are anticipated to be a result
of labor mobility across borders rather than of an improvement in the national
economy. In other words, as far as the economic dimension goes, support for
membership is driven by perceived individual benefits. Moreover, the
average Bulgarian seems to want to join the EU for non-economic reasons
that are at least as important as those related to the nation’s economy, one of
which is the perceived benefits for future generations rather than immediate
returns. Therefore, although the losers from transition perceive themselves as
losers from integration (as argued by Tucker et al., 2002), they are likely to
support integration for the benefit of their children.
Overall, the average electorate’s support for integration is based upon
expectations for the future, being linked either to Brussels’ ability to improve
good governance at the national level or to the individual’s own ability to
take advantage of the opportunities granted by EU membership. Although
some of these findings carry implications for the general study of public
attitudes towards integration, others may be case specific.
Notes
This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation 
under a program of the Global Development Network. All opinions expressed
are those of the authors and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI or the GDN.
We wish to thank three anonymous referees for their comments. A replication
data set and some accompanying material can be found at http://
ccolonescu.googlepages.com/data.
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1 The Web appendix (at http://ccolonescu.googlepages.com/data) provides
the questions that are used to construct each variable, as well as the method
of construction. Summary statistics of the variables are also reported there.
2 See http://ccolonescu.googlepages.com/data.
3 Table A2 in the Web appendix provides an excerpt from the survey
instrument.
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